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ORIGINALISM—THE FORGOTTEN YEARS
Frank B. Cross*
Originalism became best known as a Reagan era conservative reaction to the Warren Court era and the desire to restrain
what was perceived as judicial activism. Pam Karlan notes that
“[o]riginalism as a primary theory of constitutional interpretation had its origin in the conservative attack on various Warren
1
Court decisions.” James Fleming declared that originalism was
“a conservative ideology that emerged in reaction against the
2
Warren Court” and “did not exist” prior to that time. The
Warren Court was “accused of ignoring the original meaning of
3
the Constitution.” The Court was charged with “abandonment
4
of originalism.”
Few disagree with this story. For the most part liberal critics
are happy to accept the thesis and approve of the Warren
Court’s “living Constitution.” Jack Balkin’s efforts to defend a
liberal originalism have generally not sought to claim that the
Warren Court was engaged in authentic originalism. Yet this
widespread acceptance of the nature of the Warren Court’s
jurisprudence has not been closely examined. In this article, I
explore originalism in the Warren Court and its meaning.

* Herbert D. Kelleher Centennial Professor of Business Law, University of Texas
School of Law.
1. Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
385, 396 (2009); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
88 (2009) (suggesting that contemporary originalism was “birthed” by “critics of the
Warren Court”); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
599, 599–601 (2004) (describing the development as a reaction to the Warren Court);
David S. Law & David McGowan, There is Nothing Pragmatic About Originalism, 102
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 86, 100 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/
Colloquy/2007/27 (discussing the jurisprudence of the Warren and Burger Courts as “a
low point for originalism”);.
2. James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1335, 1347 (1997).
3. Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s
Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 233 (2004).
4. Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 16 (2009).
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I. THE PRACTICE OF ORIGINALISM IN THE WARREN
COURT
Authentic reliance on originalism can be difficult to
measure. Legal commentators have critiqued Supreme Court
opinions as non-originalist, but such commentators are not a
definitive resource for accurate resolution, and they may be
influenced by their own ideological biases. There is, however, a
readily available test for whether the Justices are using
originalism—the legal materials upon which their opinions rely. I
examine the use of originalist sources during the Warren Court.
The potentially relevant originalist sources are myriad, but
some stand out as especially important. The Federalist has been
5
called “the most important of originalist sources.” This is
certainly true for the Supreme Court, which has cited to this
resource more than twice as often as any other originalist source,
6
from 1955 to 1984. James Madison suggested that The Federalist
was “the most authentic exposition of the text of the federal
Constitution, as understood by the Body which prepared & the
7
Authority which accepted it.” Edwin Meese, the primary author
of originalism in response to the Warren Court, declared that it
8
was The Federalist “which explained the Founders’ intent.”
A second important originalist resource is Elliot’s Debates,
9
a record of the ratifying discussion for the Constitution. Contemporary understanding of originalism gives central importance
to the ratification of the Constitution and the understanding of
the ratifiers. Today’s originalism focuses on original meaning,
rather than any subjective intent. The ratifiers are commonly
10
regarded as the best resource on such original meaning. Until
5. Pamela C. Corley, Robert M. Howard, & David C. Nixon, The Supreme Court
and Opinion Content: The Use of the Federalist Papers, 58 POL. RES. Q. 329, 329 (2005).
6. Id. at 330.
7. Letter to Thomas Jefferson from James Madison (Feb. 8, 1825), in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 219 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
8. Edwin Meese III, Challenges Facing Our System of Justice, 3 AVE. MARIA L.
REV. 303, 307–08 (2005).
9. JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS
IN CONVENTION, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1827).
10. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power
To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 551 (1994) (suggesting that originalists find
original meaning in “the text of the Constitution, as originally understood by the people
who ratified it”); Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Records of the State
Ratifying Conventions as a Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 2009
U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 461 (2009) (identifying one form of original meaning as “what the
persons who participated in the state ratifying conventions thought that the Constitution
meant”); Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1136 (1998) (declaring that originalism “is the idea that the words

!!!CROSS-281-ORIGINALISMTHEFORGOTTENYEARS.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

5/31/2012 12:08 PM

ORIGINALISM—THE FORGOTTEN YEARS

39

very recently, Elliot’s Debates was the primary source of
ratification records, commonly used by the U.S. Supreme Court.
A third originalist resource worthy of consideration is James
11
Madison’s notes on the constitutional convention (Farrand).
Although originalists tend to place more importance on the
ratification of the Constitution than on its drafting, Madison’s
records of the convention might still have importance in
ascertaining the original meaning of the text. These were the
second most used source of original intent at the Supreme Court
12
between 1953 and 1984. Some suggest that statements in the
privacy of the convention may be more reliable evidence of
original meaning than public claims of partisans in the
13
ratification debates.
Numerous other originalist sources are available to the
Court, including dictionaries, early court opinions, corresponddence among framers, commentaries, actions of the First
Congress, and other documents, but The Federalist, Elliot’s
Debates and Farrand are the most prominent originalist resources used by the Court.
My study on the use of these originalist sources has Justicevotes for opinions relying on such originalist sources as the unit
of analysis in the cases in which at least one opinion utilized this
source. For an example of the operation of the coding system,
14
consider Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. Justice Souter wrote an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, which was joined by
15
Justice Ginsburg, in which he cited The Federalist. Justice Scalia
wrote a dissenting opinion in which he was joined by Justice
16
Stevens, which also cited The Federalist numerous times. Justice
Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion, in which he cited The
17
Federalist once. The majority opinion, authored by Justice
O’Connor and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
18
Kennedy, and Justice Breyer, did not cite to The Federalist.
of the Constitution must be understood as they were understood by the ratifying public
at the time of enactment”).
11. 1–3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed.,
1st ed. 1911).
12. Corley, Howard & Nixon, supra note 5, at 330.
13. See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1189 (2003) (arguing for
ascribing greater interpretive weight to this resource).
14. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
15. Id. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 555, 558, 568, 569, 578 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 542 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Under my coding, Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Scalia, Stevens, and
Thomas receive a “1” in the column for this case, for citing The
19
Federalist. Justices O’Connor, Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Breyer
receive a “0” in this column for this case, because some other
Justice relied on The Federalist in an opinion in the case and they
did not.
Counting Justice-votes is preferable to counting decisions. It
reveals the strength of originalism by the number of Justices an
opinion commands. Moreover, this approach captures the use
(or lack of use) of originalism in concurring and dissenting
opinions.
There is no way to discern whether a Justice truly relied on
originalist sources in reaching a decision. Such sources might
simply “decorate” an opinion, for public consumption, without
actually playing a role in the Justice’s decision making. But any
attempt to evaluate the causative influence of the originalist
source would require mind reading. Many constitutional
20
opinions contain no originalist references whatsoever, so the
presence of such a resource reveals some deference to the
interpretive methodology.
All Justice-votes are counted equally. One might suggest
that the opinion author be given particular credit for originalist
references, as the drafter. The author may not truly control the
opinion, though, except for a lone dissent or concurrence.
Research shows that an opinion author may be required to make
various compromises to retain the coalition behind his or her
opinion. For majority opinions, political science research suggests that their content is driven by the preferences of the
21
necessary fifth voter. Efforts to analyze the question
empirically have found that the opinion author has unique
influence over the opinion’s content, but that other Justices also
22
have influence. I presume that each Justice joining an
originalist opinion is additional evidence of the role of
originalism.
18. See id. at 509–39 (majority opinion).
19. The coding does not take into account the fact that they cited different
Federalist Papers, or that an opinion may have relatively more citations to the source.
20. See Corley, Howard & Nixon, supra note 5, at 330, 334 (noting that The
Federalist is by far the most used originalist source by the Court but that it appears as a
citation in only a small fraction of constitutional opinions).
21. See Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment
on the U.S. Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 276, 279 (2007).
22. See Chris W. Bonneau, et al., Agenda Control, the Median Justice, and the
Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 890, 902–03 (2007).
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There are occasional cases in which a Justice references an
originalist source, such as The Federalist, and then holds that it is
not helpful to resolve the case before the Court. These are
included in my analysis. Recognizing and distinguishing an
originalist source is testimony to its importance to the Justice,
and an authentic originalist would carefully evaluate the
applicability of originalist sources in deciding. My evaluation of
originalism is limited to the Founding era. The approach is also
relevant to other controversies, such as those involving the 14th
Amendment.
The first analysis is for the number of Justice-votes citing
The Federalist in Supreme Court opinions. Figure 1 displays the
numbers of Justices joining opinions that cited this source over
five year period averages throughout history before and during
the Warren Court.

Federalist

100

150

FIGURE 1
USE OF THE FEDERALIST OVER TIME

0

50

Warren Court

1800

1850

1900
Years

1950

2000

The Federalist had seen intermittent use through history, until
the beginning of the Warren Court era, when its use consistently
and dramatically expanded to heights never before reached at
the Court. By the end of the Warren Court, use of The Federalist
was more than twice as high as at any prior time.
The next analysis adopts the same method for examining
the use of Elliot’s Debates by the Court. This resource became
available early in the 19th Century. Figure 2 displays the numbers of Justice-votes citing the resource, again with five-year
averages.
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FIGURE 2
USE OF ELLIOT’S DEBATES OVER TIME
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The pattern for citations to Elliot’s Debates is similar to that for
The Federalist. The source had been intermittently relied upon,
with peaks and valleys over the history of the Court. With the
Warren Court era, however, its usage grew dramatically. There
was another steady increase in use, more than doubling the
number of Justice-votes citing the ratification debates at any
time in history.
As for Farrand’s publication of Madison’s convention notes,
this resource was unavailable for much of our history. It was first
published in 1911. The pattern of its usage by Justices of the
Court is displayed in Figure 3.

20
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USE OF FARRAND OVER TIME
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Until the Warren Court era, the Farrand records were seldom
used. In the Warren Court, however, use of this source exploded.
All three of the primary originalist resources saw considerably
expanded use by the Warren Court.
Overall uses of originalism grew considerably during the
Warren Court era. Originalist reliance was not uniform among
the Justices. Table 1 displays the total number of opinions in
which major Warren Court Justices used one of the three
sources (The Federalist, Elliot’s Debates, or Farrand).
TABLE 1
JUSTICES’ USE OF ORIGINALISM
Justice
Black
Brennan
Douglas
Harlan
Stewart
Warren
White

Originalist Sources
28
30
32
38
29
26
17

The numbers are not directly comparable, because some justices
served for briefer periods under Chief Justice Warren (Justice
Marshall, for example, was not appointed until near the end of
the Warren Court era and had little opportunity to cite
originalist sources). We can see from these numbers that Justice
Harlan was probably the greatest originalist but that all the
Justices used originalism with roughly comparable frequency.
If one judges originalism by reliance on originalist materials,
the Warren Court was a time of much expanded originalism, as
compared to prior constitutional history, and all the Justices
joined in using originalist sources. Originalism was not “sub23
merged and marginalized” as commonly claimed. Rather than a
departure from a history of originalism, as suggested by Robert
24
Bork and others, the Warren Court saw the interpretive
method’s efflorescence. Judged simply by invocation of the
23. JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 39 (2005).

AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A

24. See, e.g., Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1, 5 & n.10 (1971). See also Berman, supra note 1, at 88; Karlan, supra note 1,
at 396; Law & McGowan, supra note 1, at 100; Whittington, supra note 1, at 599–601.
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primary originalist resources, the Warren Court was much more
originalist than any prior Court.
II. THE MEANING OF WARREN COURT ORIGINALISM
The expanded use of originalism in the Warren Court is
striking, as is the fact that the Justices of the era received no
credit for originalism. The Justices made much greater use of
originalist sources in reaching their decisions than in past years.
Why did they not get credit for doing so? Why were they
attacked for being non-originalist?
Those critics who recognized the Warren Court’s use of
originalism often disregarded it as inauthentic. The Justices of
the era may have cited to originalist sources, but the critic would
argue that they did not rely upon them but merely used
originalism to “decorate” opinions grounded in other rationales.
While Justice Brennan often used originalist sources, the theory
that he was truly influenced by the theory was derided as
25
“fanciful.”
A famous historian’s review of the Supreme Court’s
26
reliance on originalism was quite critical. While not limited to
the Warren Court, it focused on the Court’s opinions in cases on
reapportionment, church and state, and other opinions of the
era. The author concluded that the Court too often reached
27
“conclusions that are plainly erroneous.” In one case, Justice
Black relied on sources that “were so stale and inadequate that a
properly trained historical scholar would hesitate to suggest that
an undergraduate student rely on them for anything more than
28
‘a once important, although now outdated view.’” Perhaps the
Justices are simply poor at historical analysis, as some have
29
suggested. Alternatively, the Justices are simply not committed
25. Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at Originalism, 36
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 113, 118 (2002).
26. Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV.
119 (1965).
27. Id. at 155.
28. Id. at 121 (quoting Paul L. Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of
American Constitutional History, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 64, 64–65 (1963)).
29. E.g., GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 97 (1992) (contending that judges “routinely
botch history when they set their hands to it”); Buckner F. Melton Jr., Clio at the Bar: A
Guide to Historical Method for Legists and Jurists, 83 MINN. L. REV. 377, 384 (1998)
(suggesting that lawyers and judges are “ill-equipped to understand the rudiments of the
process of historical research”); Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and
Critique of History in Adjudication, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 595 (2000) (arguing that
“[l]egal professionals are not competent to umpire historical disputes”).
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to getting history right but instead seek to use it as a support for
30
decisions reached on different grounds.
The Court’s use of originalism may thus be dismissed as a
rhetorical flourish aimed at providing greater legitimacy to the
Court’s ruling. Americans have an “almost religious adoration”
31
of the Framers. Invoking them in support of an opinion may
enhance that opinion’s appeal. Some suggest that originalism has
32
an innate populist appeal. Its use “can evoke emotional
responses that alternatives to originalism cannot directly
33
match.”
As a result, the Justices may strategically reference
originalist sources in support of their decisions, even if they did
not rely on those sources in reaching their decisions. A study of
the Court’s use of The Federalist found that it was most
commonly used in controversial outcomes, such as those striking
down a statute, formally altering precedent, or decided by a
34
minimum winning coalition (5-4). The authors suggested that
citing this source was tactical, “to bolster the legitimacy of the
35
court when opinions assert judicial power.” Another study of
36
use of The Federalist reached similar results.
The research is by no means conclusive, though, and it is
certainly possible that a Justice might sincerely rely on originalist
sources. Perhaps the fundamental appeal of originalism is that
“if judges don’t follow the original understandings, they will be
37
free to do whatever they want.” A central concern of
originalism “is that judges be constrained by the law rather than
be left free to act according to their own lights, a course that
38
originalists regard as essentially lawless.” The “best response”

30. See Kelly, supra note 26, at 131 (concluding that historical reliance was merely a
“rationale for politically inspired activism”).
31. CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 181
(1969).
32. See generally Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009).
33. R. George Wright, Originalism and the Problem of Fundamental Fairness, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 687, 689 (2008).
34. Corley, supra note 5, at 334.
35. Id. at 336.
36. See Robert J. Hume, The Use of Rhetorical Sources by the U.S. Supreme Court,
40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 817, 838 (2006).
37. David A. Stauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be Originalists, 31 HARV. J.L.
PUB. POL’Y 969, 973 (2008).
38. Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 106 (1989).

!!!CROSS-281-ORIGINALISMTHEFORGOTTENYEARS.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

46

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

5/31/2012 12:08 PM

[Vol. 28:37

to judicial discretion is to “lash judges to the solid mast of
39
history.” But this may be a futile endeavor.
The historical originalist record is quite incomplete. The
ratifiers of the Constitution were largely unaware of the content
of The Federalist when approving the text and some were
40
published only after ratifications. The ratification records are
41
incomplete and often unreliable, and often conflicted on the
42
meaning of the ratified text. Madison’s notes recorded in
Farrand were quite an incomplete record of the constitutional
43
convention and may have been biased. The records that exist
may be fatally compromised by “the editorial interventions of
44
hirelings and partisans.” Given the indeterminacy, originalism
45
has been described as “questing after a chimera.”
In addition, developments over the past two centuries
obscure the application of originalism. Technological and
societal developments mean that the originalist record requires
some translation to be applied to contemporary controversies,
and such translation requires subjective judgment. The translation to changed circumstances typically involves the
identification of the principles underlying the original text. Yet
the proper level of generality to be ascribed to those principles is
quite uncertain. When deciding whether protections against
search and seizure apply to various modern circumstances,
unknown centuries ago (e.g., thermal imaging), the Justices
identify the purpose of the constitutional provision to apply it to
the question. Yet this identification may be quite indeterminate,
freeing the Justices to adopt whatever conclusion they wish.
These three features, the somewhat obscure historical
record, changed circumstances, and uncertain level of generality
conspire to render originalism indeterminate in its findings.
Justice Scalia has conceded that in a case there may be “plenty
of room for disagreement as to what original meaning was, and
39. Whittington, supra note 1, at 599.
40. Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the
Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801, 826–29 (2009).
41. See James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the
Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1986).
42. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
519, 586 (2003) (“If the Constitution means whatever its ratifiers understood it to mean,
then different conventions arguably ratified different things.”).
43. See Hutson, supra note 41, at 25; LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND
THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 287 (2000).
44. Hutson, supra note 41, at 2.
45. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204, 222 (1980).
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even more as to how that original meaning applies to the
46
situation before the [C]ourt.”
As a result, originalism may be manipulated to suit the ends
of the deciding Justice. This is the originalist critique of the
Warren Court. The Justices of the Warren Court may have used
originalist sources, even at a high rate, but they did so selectively
in pursuit of an ideological agenda. This claim can be checked by
examining the nature of the decisions supported by originalist
sources.
Political scientists commonly categorize the direction of
47
Supreme Court opinions as liberal or conservative. While this
coding is imperfect, the resource is commonly used and has
facial validity in its results (e.g., Scalia and Thomas appear as
conservatives, Douglas and Marshall as liberals). The effect of
originalist sources might be seen in a comparison between the
ideology of Justice-votes in cases involving use of these sources
and the ideology of such votes in other cases. Table 1 reports this
comparison for leading members of the Warren Court.
TABLE 2
ORIGINALIST SOURCES AND IDEOLOGY IN THE WARREN
COURT
Justice
Black
Brennan
Douglas
Harlan
Stewart
Warren
White

Liberal Originalism
64.3%
76.2%
78.0%
35.0%
37.0%
80.8%
41.1%

All Liberal
81.7%
83.5%
88.7%
37.2%
44.5%
79.2%
44.4%

When liberal Justices used originalism, their votes on the merits
were consistently liberal. Such votes tended to be slightly more
conservative than their overall voting record in all cases, so
originalism may have had some conservative directional tug. But
during the Warren Court era, Justices who relied on originalism
produced results roughly in accord with their ideological
46. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 45 (1997).
47. The source commonly used for this categorization is the U.S. Supreme Court
Database. THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org (last
visited Sept. 23, 2011).
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preferences. There is at best mild evidence that originalism
constrained some of the Justices.
This lends some support to claims that the Justices of the
period did not sincerely use originalism to decide cases but
merely employed originalist resources to add legitimacy to
results reached on other grounds. So there may be some validity
to the conservative critique of Warren Court originalism. The
Justices may have simply invoked originalism to legitimize
decisions reached on other grounds.
The use of originalism to support predetermined ideological
outcomes may be more of an indictment of originalism, though,
than an indictment of the Warren Court Justices. To examine
this possibility, I considered the voting record of post-Warren
Court conservative Justices and their use of originalism. Table 3
displays the liberal votes of various Justices, including the
modern conservative stalwarts, in cases using originalist sources,
as compared with all cases.
TABLE 3
ORIGINALIST SOURCES AND IDEOLOGY OUTSIDE THE
WARREN COURT
Justice
Scalia
Thomas
Rehnquist
Kennedy
Stevens
O’Connor
Breyer

Liberal Originalism
25.0%
21.7%
21.8%
40.0%
67.5%
30.5%
82.6%

All Liberal
24.3%
17.8%
18.5%
35.3%
63.9%
32.9%
62.8%

As with the Justices of the Warren Court, the ideological
direction of these Justices’ votes using originalism closely
parallel the ideology of all their votes. The slight differences are
likely attributable to random variation. The only dramatic
difference is for Justice Breyer, and this could have been
attributable to his desire to legitimate liberal constitutional
decisions.
We do not know the Justices internal ideological preferences for particular cases. Perhaps they vote ideologically in
every case (and Justices Scalia and Thomas happen to prefer the
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liberal result about twenty percent of the time). Perhaps they are
constrained sometimes by legal materials, but there is no
evidence that originalism is any more constraining than any
48
alternative legal materials. In any case, it is clear that liberal
Justices who use originalism reach distinctly liberal results, while
conservative Justices employing originalism reach quite
conservative results. This need not be evidence of bad faith, it
may simply be testimony to the psychological power of
49
motivated reasoning.
CONCLUSION
The wide perception that the Warren Court rejected
originalism for a living constitution is unsupported by the data.
The Warren Court deployed originalist sources more than any
prior Court in history. It may not have been maximally
50
originalist, but in context it was certainly a relatively originalist
Court.
It is fair to question whether the Warren Court’s originalism
was truly sincere. The Justices may simply have used originalist
sources to decorate results grounded in other bases. But this
effect is not limited to the Warren Court. Subsequent Justices,
including professed originalists show a similar pattern of

48. This is consistent with a study of federalism opinions. See Smith, supra note 3, at
284. A study of votes on the Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion. See Sara C.
Benesh & Jason J. Czarnezki, The Ideology of Legal Interpretation, 29 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 113, 114–15 (2009) (“[A]rguments suggesting that legal interpretation is determinative and hence alleviates room for attitudinally-motivated outcomes are
overstated.”). In addition, a nonempirical examination of cases citing The Federalist
suggested that the citations were primarily for the sake of appearances and that it was
“hard to come up with more than a small handful of cases where The Federalist even
arguably played a decisive role in the Court’s decision.” Melvyn R. Durchslag, The
Supreme Court and the Federalist Papers: Is There Less Here than Meets the Eye?, 14 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 243, 313 (2005).
49. Motivated reasoning is simply the tendency for people’s perceptions of facts to
be influenced by their underlying values or ideology. Eileen Braman & Thomas E.
Nelson, Mechanism of Motivated Reasoning?: Analogical Perception in Discrimination
Disputes, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 940, 941 (2007). The concept is well-established in
psychology and has been applied to legal decisions. See generally id.
50. In many constitutional cases, the Justices use no originalist sources. Jeffrey M.
Shaman, The End of Originalism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 83, 87 (2010) (“[T]he vast
majority of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution have been
nonoriginalist in their methodology.”). However, a comparison of the data for the
Warren Court and subsequent Courts, such as the Rehnquist Court, considered more
originalist, shows that later Courts have made significantly more use of The Federalist but
not Farrand or Elliot’s Debates. The Warren Court was not strikingly less originalist than
the Rehnquist Court.
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convenient ideological outcomes. Any problem of insincerity
seems associated with originalism itself, not the Justices of the
Warren Court.
These findings do not wholly dispel the potential influence
of originalism at the Court. I study only outcomes, and it is
possible that originalism had a material influence on the content
51
of the Court’s opinions and decision rules that they laid down.
There is no apparent way to measure this, however, and one
would expect that a powerful originalist decision would affect
outcomes—conservative critics of the Warren Court certainly so
profess.
52
The decision in District of Columbia v. Heller is considered
by some to represent an apotheosis of originalism at the Court.
Yet it aptly illustrates the findings of this Article. All of the
Justices relied heavily on originalism, yet the outcome split on
predictable ideological valences. Consequently, it seems fair to
question whether it was truly originalism that drove the Justices’
opinions, as opposed to their policy preferences. Heller is not
53
unique in this regard.
Moreover, while the opinions were flush with originalist
sources, a key portion of the majority opinion totally ignored
originalism. Justice Scalia cited instances where the government
could regulate arms notwithstanding the Second Amendment
but offered zero originalist basis for these exceptions. Nelson
Lund has argued that this aspect of the opinion departed so far
54
from originalism that the opinion should be considered poor.
The opinions in Heller look suspiciously like policy driven
opinions, decorated with originalist support.
Some time ago, Justice Scalia suggested, “It would be hard
to count . . . on the hairs of one’s youthful head, the opinions
that have in fact been rendered not on the basis of what the
Constitution originally meant, but on the basis of what the

51. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case
Studies of Consistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 HARV. J.L.
PUB. POL’Y 217, 237 (2010) (contending that originalism restricts the possible bases for
decisions).
52. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
53. See Richard Primus, The Functions of Ethical Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE
ALSO 79, 79 (2010) (observing that the Justices “frequently divide on questions of
original meaning, and the divisions have a way of mapping what we might suspect are the
justices’ leanings about the merits of the cases irrespective of originalist considerations”).
54. See Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist
Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1345 (2009).
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judges currently thought it desirable for it to mean.” While he
would resort to originalism to combat this effect, originalism
appears to offer no restraining influence. Justices may simply
cloak their ideological biases with materials from the ratification
era that are available. It is difficult to find a professed originalist,
in the judiciary or in the academy, who believes that the original
meaning of the Constitution is significantly different from his or
her personal policy preferences.

55. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852
(1989).

